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Article 9

Turning Practice into Progress: Better Lawyering
Through Experimentation
MichaelJ. Sak"
This Article argues that trial practitioners and programs that
teach trial practice suffer from reliance on only two pillars of
wisdom: intuition and tradition. It proposes the addition of a
third: empirical verification.' Developing a program of empirical
verification would constitute a radical alteration of the way lawyers think about the process of acquiring knowledge about trial
practice and would rapidly accelerate the knowledge that is acquired. Old, ineffective techniques could be revealed and discarded; new ideas would be tested and then adopted or modified or
rejected more rapidly and confidently.
This paper discusses a plan for marrying the art of trial advocacy with a methodology for systematically testing ideas about
advocacy. I suggest a way that National Institute of Trial Advocacy
(NITA) courses, with the investment of modest additional effort,
could become laboratories for generating new knowledge about
effective advocacy.
I. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRIAL PRACTICE
Lawyers tend to believe in authority and argument. Unfortunately, what may work well for the development of doctrine cannot transfer successfully to the practice of law. One cannot discover the most effective ways to structure a case for presentation, to
elicit testimony from a witness, or to argue persuasively to a jury,
by relying on what lawyers have always done, by deferring to the
assertions of leading practitioners, or by sitting around and argu-

* Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. I want to express my thanks to
Richard Matasar for his comments on an earlier draft.
Presented as part of the program "Trial Advocacy Teaching in the 90s and Beyond:
A Critical Evaluation of Trial Advocacy Teaching Methodologies and Designs for the Future," sponsored by the ABA Section of Litigation, the National Institute of Trial Advocacy, and the Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Systematic experience might be another phrase for this concept, with emphasis
on the systematic.
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ing about what ought to work-or even by taking a NITA course.
Those approaches will teach one only what some people believe is
effective, and that begs the question. How do those folks know?
Long experience and diligent practice cannot insure effectiveness.
To have done something only passably well for many years is not
a royal road to knowledge. Indeed, unanimous consensus that a
bad technique is a good one will merely result in neutralizing the
harmful effects of the bad technique so that we cannot discover
that it works less well than an untried alternative. It probably is
not far afield to assume that about a third of the trial tactics lawyers commonly use are effective, a third are merely wasted effort,
and a third are counter-productive-and that we do not yet know
which is which, even though some of us may think we do.2
What will persuade is an empirical question, not a legal or
philosophical one. It is a matter of psychology, not jurisprudence.
Effective answers about "what works" will come not from reflection or intuition but from empirical inquiries: from concrete experience, from experimental tests of alternative techniques, and
perhaps from borrowing findings about phenomena of persuasion
from disciplines that study persuasion empirically.'
In criticizing legal education nearly a decade ago, Derek Bok
wrote that "[e]ven the most rudimentary facts about the legal
system are unknown or misunderstood."4 A major part of the
problem is that the legal profession has no systematic methodology for producing knowledge 'about its task or about how well it is
accomplishing that task.
How do lawyers come to believe that certain techniques are
successful and others are not? How does the acquisition of practice knowledge among lawyers compare with the acquisition of
knowledge in comparable fields? How do lawyers come to
know-or think they know-what works and what does not in the
practice of law? The two basic sources are advice from others and

2 I am assuming that the intuition of lawyers is on an approximate par with that
of surgeons. When the favored procedures of surgery have been put to empirical tests,
it has been found that about one third are effective, one third are neither helpful nor
harmful but merely wasteful, and one third do more harm than good. See generally
Barnes, Discarded Operations: Surgical Innovation by Trial and Error, in COSTS, RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF SURGERY 109 (J. Bunker, B. Barnes & F. Mosteller eds. 1977) [hereinafter
COSTS AND RISKS] and Gilbert, McPeek & Mosteller, Progress in Surgery and Anesthesia:
Benefits and Risks of Innovative Therapy, in COSTS AND RISKS, supra, 124, 127-29.
3 See infra notes 23-24.
4 D. Bok, Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers 1981-82, reprinted in Bok, A
Flawed System of Law Practice and Training 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581 (1983).
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personal experience based on (forgive the expression) trial and
error. If we ask how those from whom the advice is received
know, we realize that the first of those categories is nothing more
than the second one in disguise. Trial and error is not without
value. But it progresses at a glacial pace and sometimes can be
deceptive.5
Imagine, for example, that surgeons relied on the same methodology as trial practitioners to learn their art. Suppose the question were whether radical mastectomy is the best treatment for
breast cancer. The student would be told that this was the accepted way of treating the problem, that the profession has been
using it for over a century, that many patients who received the
treatment obviously survived, and that many of the most famous
and wealthiest practitioners swear by the technique. If controversy
arises, they might also be informed that "it could be argued" that
the technique works better than any others that could be developed.6
What is missing from this picture? For traditional lawyers, not
much. For empirical disciplines generally,7 what is missing is the
essence of the creation of knowledge: deliberate, systematic observation-especially experimentation.
Does it follow that because many women survive the disease
that the treatment "works"?8 Perhaps they would have survived
without it. Perhaps they survived in spite of it. Perhaps with an
alternative treatment more would have survived or they would
have survived longer. Or perhaps an alternative would have produced no better outcomes, but would have done so at lower cost
or less pain or disfigurement. The only way to answer these questions is through comparison of one technique against its alternatives. In short, by experimentation.'

5 See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
6 Someone suggested recently that when it comes to dealing with questions about
the real world, the principal lesson of legal education is that when you do not know the
answer to a problem, instead of introducing your guess with "I think . . . " you say "It
could be argued that . . ." Discussion with Daniel Rosen, Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans (1990) (recollecting address by Martha
Minow, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Association of American Law Schools
Conference, New Orleans (Jan. 1989)).
7 Trial practice is one of these, but does not yet behave as if it is.
8 The familiar fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc.
9 By "experiment" we do not mean "trying out something new" in a loose sense.
We mean the structured observation of how two or more alternative things or events
(independent variables) affect something of interest (dependent variables). In a well de-
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To know that radical mastectomy has long been employed or
that many "successful" practitioners have used the technique may
say more about a field's monopoly on practice (so that alternatives cannot arise to compete) or its commitment to tradition (so
that nothing else is available or considered respectable enough to
try). The conclusion that someone survived or that a case was
won may follow from a successful technique. But it can follow
from techniques that simply are not disastrous (and cannot be
seen to pale in comparison to more successful alternatives because those alternatives are not being tried). If pressed for evidence that a recommended technique "works" and imaginable
alternatives would be less effective, trial practitioners or teachers
of trial practice could not produce much more than arguments
based on the authority of the technique's longevity or endorsements to support the claim of its efficacy.
A practitioner who had the benefit of experiments directly
comparing radical surgery with more conservative procedures
would be able to know that, at least for certain kinds of breast
cancer, something far less radical than was practiced for so long
would have equal success. Lawyers sometimes find it a source of
fascination, and perhaps amusement, to discover that numerous
11 or physics, 12
other fields, such as medicine, 10 psychology,
have made so many false starts or outright errors, or still have
demonstrable shortcomings and controversies. What may not be
obvious is the advantage those fields possess because they have a
means of figuring out what they can and cannot do, what they do
and do not know. In particular, the advantage lies in the knowledge-building machinery which can reveal their errors. Because
the trial practitioners' field lacks a tradition of systematic empirical testing, they have not yet reached the stage where they can

signed experiment, the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables
may be inferred without ambiguity. For details, see J. MONAHAN & L WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-82 (2d ed. 1990); D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963).
10 See, e.g., P. D'ARCY & J. GRIFFIN, IATROGENIC
DISEASES (2d ed. 1979).
11

See, e.g., P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANAL-

YSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954); W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT
(1968); J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981); Dawes & Corrigan, Linear Models in Decision-Making, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL

BULL. 95 (1974); Dawes, Faust & Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE

1668 (1989).
12 See e.g., L FRANK, THE BIG SPLASH (1990) (describing hostile reaction of scientific
community to Professor Frank's own small comet theory); D. PRICE, SCIENCE SINCE BABY-

LON (1961); J. ROSTAND, ERROR AND DECEPTION IN SCIENCE (1960).
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point to all the mistakes that have been unlearned. The informed
practitioner in most empirical disciplines, almost by instinct,
points to empirical studies of competing ideas."3 The trial
practitioner has no similar body of information to consult.
Breast cancer treatment is an apt example, because for a
century oncologists "knew"-even though they did not and could
not know because they had not conducted experiments to test
their beliefs-that radical mastectomy was the best treatment for
breast cancer. They completed the first randomized trials 14 little
more than a decade ago and found, contrary to long-held dogma,
that a lumpectomy 5 plus radiation was as successful as the more
extreme procedure.16 The accepted answer and the correct answer sometimes are at odds with each other. Is it likely to be different in the world of trial practice? (Does it follow that because
many cases have been won that the techniques employed must
"work"? Unlike medicine, someone gets to win each trial.) Moreover, the illustration also shows that law is not so far behind in
bringing systematic research methods to bear on its subject mat17

ter.

We might consider why the usual casual approach to learning
from experience, trial and error, is slow and ultimately may be
incapable of doing what we ask of it. One key reason already has
been suggested: in the absence of a comparison group, it is impossible to know what to make of our observations. From the observation that the use of a given technique is followed by success
does- not mean that the technique is responsible for the success
rather than having made success less likely."8 But casual comparisons are not enough; without systematic comparison it is hard to
know what is producing what effect. Other factors may vary along

13 This provides no automatic or magic solution. But it gives the debaters
something substantial'on which to chew.
14 A synonym for experiment, much used among clinical medical researchers.
15 Removal only of the tumor.
16 See Fisher, Bauer & Margolese, Five Year Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial
Comparing Total Mastectomy and Segmental Mastectomy With or Without Radiation in the
Treatment of Breast Cancer, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 665, 665 (1985) ("treatment by segmental mastectomy, with or without breast irradiation, resulted in disease-free, distant-disease-free, and overall survival at five years that was no worse than that after total breast
removal").
17 One treatise on the subject maintains that the first clinical medical experiment
was conducted in the early 1950s. -See A. COCHRANE, EFFECTmVENESS AND EFFIcIENCY:
RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH SERvicEs 22 (1971).
18 Sometimes we succeed in spite of our efforts.
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with the techniques of interest, and it will be difficult or impossible to tell whether the observed differences (or observed19
nondifferences) were due to the intended treatment differences
or to uncontrolled variation.2" Moreover, subtle differences may
be discernible only with large sample sizes and statistical tests.
And interactions of the treatment with other variables 21 will be
almost impossible to spot without careful collection and systematic
analysis of data. Without systematic encounters with a given phenomenon, it is too easy to get lost.
The instinct to test is not entirely alien to trial lawyers. Lawyers sometimes try their cases out on colleagues or taxi drivers or,
more recently, on mock jurors, 22 to see how they play. But without a technology of systematic testing and a tradition to use it,
these instincts do not materialize into productive efforts.
On the other hand, some experiments and other kinds of
empirical studies already have been carried out on the legal process, though more often in the service of the development of
legal policy or basic learning, rather than trial tactics. Thus, we
have two lines of effort that have not yet crossed: the trial
practitioner's undeveloped taste for testing and the social
scientist's research that has rarely been aimed at answering questions of tactics or strategy.
Let us conclude this section by reversing roles another way.
Imagine a trial practitioner who is the product of a movement
that tests its techniques empirically. When asked why a certain
strategy or technique was employed, she might answer by saying
that empirical research found the technique of choice to produce
more effective results (with the magnitude of the effect and the
nature of the studies mentioned along with their citations). Moreover, she might also answer that the chosen technique or strategy
was consistent with empirical findings 24 on persuasion carried
19 Independent variables.
20 Confounding variables.
21 That is, one technique may work best under one set of circumstances, and another technique under others.
22 For examples and discussion, see J. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY (1987); Kassin, Mock Juty Trials, 7 TRIAL DIPL. J., Summer, 1984, at 26. While
almost certainly useful to individual cases, these efforts usually are too case specific to
generate useful knowledge of a general nature. In order to yield general learning, studies designed with that goal in mind would do better.
23 Examples of such experiments can be found in V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDMING
THE JURY (1986) and Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field Fxperiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer, 1988, at 67.
24 See, e.g., lists of empirical phenomena of attitude change in M. SAKS & R.
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out by basic researchers from other disciplines and with relevant
theory. 5 The next question to ask is how might we get from our
current state to so different a world of knowledge about "what
works" in trial practice.
II.

SUPPLEMENTING THE ART OF TRIAL PRACTICE
WITH THE METHOD OF EXPERIMENTATION

Trial practice, oddly enough, could readily lend itself to empirical experimentation 2 6 -especially NITA programs. The, basic
requirement is to do X half the time and to do not-X the other
'half and then to see which produces more desirable outcomes.
Once it is learned which of the alternatives is more effective, we
move on to a test of the next set of alternatives, and the next
after that. As time goes by, more and more
knowledge is generat27
ed about what works and what does not.

Let us imagine what an empirical, experimental component
of the NITA program might look like. At a particular school
where a NITA training program was taking place, students would
be informed that part of what they were to be doing would be to
test which of two strategies or tactics was the more effective. The
choices might be: whether it is better to make an extreme or a
moderate argument to a jury (e.g., to ask for a huge award or to
ask for what seems to be the most reasonable award); whether to
give witnesses on direct examination wide latitude to answer questions or keep them on a fairly short tether; or whether the better
strategy is to "defang" an adversary by presenting harmful evidence first, thereby to risk the potential costs attending offering
evidence harmful to one's own client. 21 Of course, there exist

HAsIME, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 102-04 (1986) and P. ZIMBARDO, E. EBBESEN &
C. MASLACH, INFLUENCING ATTITUDES AND CHANGING BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO
METHOD, THEORY AND APPLICATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND PERSONAL POWER (2d ed.

1977).
25 See e.g., R. PETTY & J. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL
AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986).

26 See supra note 9 the definition of "experiment."
27 Complexities can be built onto this basic framework, as seems helpful.
28 Compare R. KLONOFF & P. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY TACTICS
FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS 37, 86 (1990) (suggesting that an advocate should not introduce harmful evidence) with the usual, but contrary, practice wisdom that recommends
defanging. Research on the "inoculation" theory of resistance to persuasion supports the
defanging strategy. E.g., McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficaiy of Various Types of
Prior Belief-defense in ProducingImmunity Against Penuasion, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 327 (1961).
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many
ly.29 other such choices that trial practitioners confront repeatedAlthough all of the students would be taught both of the
experimental alternatives, when the time came to conduct their
full practice trial, half would be assigned to use one alternative
and half the other. More precisely, half of those cast as counsel
for the plaintiff (or prosecution) and half of those cast as the
defense would be randomly assigned to use one or the other
alternative. Any given practice trial might see one side or the other, or both, or neither using one or the other technique.30 So
much for the assignment of the independent variables.
To measure the dependent variables, teachers and other class
members, or nonlegally trained observers,3 1 could indicate their
own attitudes formed or changed due to the trial, or rate the
perceived effectiveness of each student attorney (who is, of
course, using whatever technique has been assigned). Most important, perhaps, the verdict of the jurors in response to each case
would be recorded. In addition, perhaps, more detailed and focused juror responses could be obtained at the end of the trial
through questionnaires or during trial with more sophisticated
electronic apparatus. 2 At the end of the session, the teachers
and students might examine the results and come to a tentative
conclusion as to which technique, if either, appeared more effective. Forms on which the ratings and verdicts were recorded
would be shipped to a central NITA location for more complete
data analysis. The results of comparable experiments from a multitude of other program sites would be gathered together and
analyzed and the results communicated through a NITA periodical or other publication.3"

29 Although trial practice treatises are written to present received wisdom more than
an array of alternative possibilities, they do make it apparent that choices must be made
about what will work best, and they can provide a useful source of alternative hypotheses if studied with that purpose in mind.
30 Thus, every possible permutation would be tested: X v. not-X, not-X v. X, not-X
v. not-X, and X v. X. Comparisons could be made not only concerning how X compares
to not-X, but what happens in cases where both are using technique X or neither are.
31 That is, people who are more similar to jurors.
32 Such as has been used in the evaluation of television commercials since the
1950s.
33 This may be the place to address briefly some methodological issues that may be
posed by the thoughtful reader.
(1) "Any given trial tactic may constitute such a small effect that it will be
swamped by all of the other things that are going on in a trial."
The answer is that even small and subtle effects can be detected using the experi-
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A variation on this basic theme might take advantage of the
large number of NITA programs conducted around the country
throughout the year.' Several different trial techniques could be
tested from semester to semester or region to region, not just
one per year.
Over a relatively short span of time a body of empirically
tested knowledge gradually would be built up by NITA. The techniques taught by NITA would evolve to reflect this learning, and
soon would be the most progressive, best informed, and most
effective trial practice training available. Eventually the NITA compendium of trial strategy and technique would itself become the
most authoritative source of knowledge about "what works."
In addition, the students, and their teachers as well, would*
learn something more than what works. They would acquire an
orientation toward knowledge about the practice of law that is
quite different from that which comes from the, passing on of
tradition or the assertion of authority. They would learn that all
the answers are not already known, but that methods exist for

mental method. Indeed, this is where they have the best chance of being detected.
Through randomization, all of the other effects are spread more or less evenly across
the two or more different experimental conditions and the only thing that systematically
varies is what we are trying to study. Moreover, this approach puts us in a good position to measure the relative impact of the technique under study, or package of techniques, compared with other influences. If the impact of a technique cannot be detected
under these conditions, then it is unlikely that it has any effect at all. That is worth
knowing.
(2) "Some teachers of trial practice think that individual student talent or personality has more to do with trial practice success than any tactical steps they could take.
Who does it and how well they do it is more important than what they do."
The same research approach can be adapted to studying the different characteristics
or performances of trial practitioners. Data can enlighten that debate as well. Once we
have a better fix on what that something is, perhaps methods can be found to help
students improve their ability to do whatever they are not doing or be whatever they are
not being. Or, perhaps students can be counseled into' or out of trial work. On the
other hand, if the specific knowledge and skills taught in trial practice cannot offer something to the student, then why teach .trial practice at all? Even athletic coaches and acting teachers believe they can make the talented more effective.
(3) "What works varies from case to case. Tactics and strategies need to be adapted to each case individually."
Somewhere between the hunger for simplistic magic answers and the despair of
"there is no answer," one ought to be able to find generally useful behavioral choices
(and know which are generally not useful) and on top of that to learn enough to know.
how to adapt them to the circumstances of particular cases. If there is nothing to be
learned, there is nothing to be taught.
34 Program sites might be left free to choose whether to participate in the experimental knowledge building aspect of the NITA program or perhaps be required to do
so, making it an intrinsic part of the NITA program.
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discovering the answers. The students and their teachers might
develop a humility about what they think they know, and an
openness to new techniques. As a result of participating in the
process of trying out different possibilities, the students might
learn not to cling to what they had once been taught or thought
they knew. Instead, the students might acquire the willingness to
try different strategies in different ways, testing for themselves
what seems to work for them (and their clients) and be prepared
to continue such experiments in a more organized way later in
their careers.
As long as we are fantasizing about what the adoption of a
program of empirical testing could do, let's not stop yet. Consider
some additional potential benefits. In part, the lack of knowledge
about what works stems from many legal scholars' view that the
5
study of the practice of law is not worth their serious attention.s
Adopting a systematic methodology for studying and advancing
knowledge of advocacy effectiveness 'may provide the additional
benefit of reinvigorating the scholarly study of advocacy and mak36
ing it academically respectable in law schools.
In addition, the NITA model of systematic testing of techniques may begin a revolution that would spread beyond the
mock trial and into actual everyday trial practice. Perhaps organized programs of research would begin among practitioners,
much as members of the medical community participate in national randomized trials of new drugs or surgical techniques. 7

35 Or perhaps the chicken precedes the egg. Perhaps the lack of knowledge growth
in trial advocacy is responsible for the lack of interest of most law faculty in the topic.
Exploring or creating new knowledge is what keeps academics interested. See, e.g., A.
TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS (1983); Landsman, Satanic
Cases: A Means of Confronting the Law's Immorality, 66 NOTRE DAME L REV. 787 (1991);
Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REv. 741 (1988).
36 Ironically, the study of persuasion has long been academically respectable in a
number of other fields, notably social psychology, where the study of attitude change is
serious business to which many members of those disciplines devote large quantities of
empirical and theoretical research time. Examine any general textbook in social psychology or any issue of one of its major journals, such as the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, the Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, or the Journal of Applied Social Psychology.
37 Is it imaginable to have trial lawyers participating in "clinical trials" of old and
new techniques? That what is common in other disciplines may strike legal educators
and scholars as alien is interesting evidence of the absence of a tradition of empirical
testing in law.
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III.

SOME POTENTIAL DANGERS OF SUCCESS

Let us assume that the lack of both a body of systematic empirical knowledge in trial practice and a means of building that
knowledge implies that trial practitioners, like their counterparts
in the medical arts of the past, have a great deal left to discover,
despite having stumbled onto a variety of successful techniques.
Assume further that the addition to NITA of a program of systematic experimentation did indeed begin to rapidly distinguish
what works from what does not, so that it became apparent that
the trial practitioners of the next century would be much more
effective than their colleagues of the past. While this rosy scenario
might give us occasion to celebrate the progress of knowledge
and the greater value of NITA, it might also raise several concerns. Perhaps some things should not be tampered with.
Uncertain knowledge of what works in trial practice insures
an equality of sorts among litigators. It helps to dampen the differences between the advocacy available for purchase by richer
and poorer clients, or clients who are repeat players rather than
one-shot players, 8 or clients who are more rather than less well
organized. If powerful new knowledge developed over time, who
would be most likely to acquire it and make use of it? Or if lawyers beyond NITA began to conduct their own experimental research, in real rather than mock cases, and to build their own
body of research findings, which would be less publicly available
than NITA's findings, who would those lawyers and their clients
be? The question answers itself. The growth of powerful knowledge is likely to confer a systematic advantage to some clients and
some interests over others, and contribute to more exaggerated
inequalities in legal services than already exist.
I am reminded of the findings of research on the effects of
the television program Sesame Street 9 which was invented to improve the school readiness of poor children thus reducing the
disadvantage they suffered relative to middle class children. The
program accomplished part of what it set out to do: poor and
minority children who watched Sesame Street did improve their
school preparedness skills. But as a result of Sesame Street the gap
38 See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW Soc. REv. 95 (1974).
39 T. CooK, H. APPLETON, R. CONNER, A. SHAFFER, G. TAMKIN & S. WEBER, "SESAME STREET" REVISITED: A CASE STUDY IN EVALUATION RESEARCH (1975).
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between the poor and the middle class grew larger, not smaller.
This occurred because the program was watched more faithfully
by middle class children, whose parents acquired supplemental
program materials and toys and spent more time reinforcing what
the program taught, so they got the most that could be gained
from the program. This is an old sociological story: those who
already enjoy advantages use those advantages to gain still more.
The same probably would happen with more effective knowledge
about trial practices.
Is this possiblility, then, an argument against developing an
experimental component of NITA? It might be, if we thought that
we could keep lawyers ignorant and equal forever. Sooner or
later, larger firms or better organized groups will discover experimental social science-if they have not already." Instead, it is an
argument that favors NITA leadership in this area, so that more
students and more lawyers have access to this potentially powerful
body of knowledge, and so such knowledge does not become
a
41
advantages.
lopsided
increasingly
side
one
tool that gives only

40 I know of (indeed, have been a consultant to) sophisticated (or at least well-financed) litigators who make use of diverse kinds of social science help. The evolution of
jury selection firms into more full blown litigation support firms begins to make this
available to a wider spectrum of litigators, but still only those who can afford it.
41 More extreme distributional possibilities exist, such as radical reform of the way
legal services are made available. Although that seems highly unlikely to come about,
consider that unlike medicine or psychology or video technology, the adversary system

would be served best by evenly balanced advocacy, thereby enhancing substance as the
controlling force in the outcomes of trials. Anything that makes practitioners more evenly matched advances this goal, and anything that leads to imbalance interferes with it.
Perhaps lawyers could be assigned to cases in evenly matched pairs, or equalized like
racehorses through handicapping.

